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Article de revue:
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Clé de citation BibTeX: Forbus1998
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Forbus, K. D., Gentner, D., Markman, A. B., & Ferguson, R. W. (1998). Analogy just looks like high-level perception: why a domain-general approach to analogical mapping is right. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 10(2), pp. 231–257.
Ajoutée par: Sterenn Audo 2008-01-22 13:34:26
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Résumé
Hofstadter and his colleagues have criticized current accounts of analogy,
claiming that such accounts do not accurately capture interactions between processes
of representation construction and processes of mapping . They suggest instead that
analogy should be viewed as a form of high level perception that encompasses both
representation building and mapping as indivisible operations within a single model .
They argue specifically against SME, our model of analogical matching . on the
grounds that it is modular, and offer instead programs such as Mitchell and
Hofstadter's Copycat as examples of the high level perception approach . In this paper
x e argue against this position on two grounds . First. we demonstrate that most oftheir
specific arguments involving SME and Copycat are incorrect . Second, we argue that
the claim that analogy is high-level perception, while in some ways an attractive
metaphor. is too vague to be useful as a technical proposal . We focus on five issues :
(1) how perception relates to analogy, (2) how flexibility arises in analogical processing .
(3) whether analogy is a domain-general process, (4) how micro-worlds should be used
in the study of analogy, and (5) how best to assess the psychological plausibility of a
model of analogy. We illustrate our discussion with examples taken from computer
models embodying both views
Ajoutée par: Sterenn Audo
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Idées
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Ajoutée par: Sterenn Audo
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