|
|
|
|
|
Chapitre d'ouvrage:
|
|
Clé de citation BibTeX: Dunbar2001
|
|
Dunbar, K. (2001). The analogical paradox : why analogy is so easy in naturalistic settings, yet so difficult in the psychological laboratory. In D. Gentner, K. J. Holyoak & B. N. Kokinov (Eds.), The analogical mind : Perspectives from Cognitive Science (pp. 313–334). Cambridge: MIT press.
Ajoutée par: Lynda Taabane 2007-12-19 12:25:34 Dernièrement modifiée par: Lynda Taabane 2008-01-23 13:20:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Résumé
These three examples exemplify what I term the "Analogical
Paradox." Subjects in many psychology experiments tend to focus on
superficial features when using analogy, whereas people in nonexperimental
contexts, such as politicians and scientists, frequently use
deeper more structural features. What is the cause of these different
findings? How can we account for this apparent paradox? On the one hand,
the results of the past 20 years of research on analogical reasoning have
found that unless subjects are given extensive training, examples, or hints,
they will be much more likely to choose superficial features than deep
structural features when using analogies (e.g., Forbus, Gentner, & Law,
1995; Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Novick 1988). On the other hand, such
results are at odds with the data that we have collected from naturalistic
settings. In both science and politics, we have found that structural analogies
are not a rare event. People very frequently access structural and relational
features when using analogy.1 The differences between the ways that
analogy is used in naturalistic versus laboratory settings provide important
insights for all models of analogical reasoning and shed new light on the
nature of complex thinking.
In this chapter, I will first provide a summary of our research on the
use of analogy in science and politics. This research demonstrates that
people outside the psychological laboratory frequently use analogies based
on structural features and higher-order relations rather than mostly using
superficial matches. I will then present one possible explanation for these
findings: that when generating analogies people search memory for
structural relations, but when they are asked to choose between different
sources they will focus on superficial features. I will discuss some recent work
Dunbar: The Analogical Paradox
Page 3 of 23
that Isabelle Blanchette and I have conducted to test this hypothesis. I will
then probe the paradox deeper. One possible reason that generation of
analogies is more structural has to do with both the way the subjects encode
the source and the way that they search memory to retrieve a source. I
conclude that the joint interaction of encoding and retrieval provides a good
fit to both naturalistic and experimental approaches to analogical reasoning
and helps us untangle the mystery underlying the Analogical Paradox.
Ajoutée par: Lynda Taabane Dernièrement modifiée par: Lynda Taabane
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Idées
pdf dispo
Ajoutée par: Lynda Taabane
|
|
|
